George W. Truman

Clarke D. Forsythe 

“I know not any thing more pleasant, or more instructive,

than to compare experience with expectation, or to register from time to time the difference between ideas and reality. It is by this kind of observation that we grow daily less liable to be disappointed.”

—Samuel Johnson

 

Since 1973, when the Supreme Court issued its edict in Roe v. Wade nationalizing abortion on demand, Americans committed to restoring a culture of life have increasingly focused their attention on presidential elections. With the victories of Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush, expectations for presidential action on abortion (and other life issues) have successively risen, to the point where today they are perhaps too high. Excessive expectations can make us forget there are constitutional limits on any president’s power. More importantly, we may fail to see the need for a broadly based strategy at the state and local levels, where vital centers of cultural influence largely determine what political leaders can achieve. Excessive expectations can, ironically, also obscure the damage done by a pro-abortion president. And they can sideline citizens who despair for greater progress in the political arena. 

A more balanced realism is needed, one that takes into account constraints on political action in a fallen world (more particularly, in a federal constitutional system with a separation of powers and checks and balances) and soberly examines what is possible in a world of constraints. The renowned Lincoln scholar, Harry Jaffa—author of Crisis of the House Divided—posed four criteria for judging statesmen: “[I]s the goal a worthy one . . . does the statesman judge wisely as to what is and what is not within his power . . . are the means selected apt to produce the intended results . . . does he say or do anything to hinder future statesmen from more perfectly attaining his goal when altered conditions bring more of that goal within the range of possibility?”¹ 

Jaffa relied on a prudential tradition that can be traced from Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas to Luther and Calvin. Jaffa’s four prudential factors—worthy goals, wise judgment as to what is possible, choosing effective means, and avoiding future preclusion of improvements—are pertinent in examining President George W. Bush’s three and a half years in office. What has he accomplished on pro-life issues? Has he pressed hard enough to get good federal judges through the Senate? Does it matter whether he is re-elected in November? Answers to these questions require putting the matter in a broader perspective, and an excellent foil is a president who effectively advanced another great moral crusade of the 20th century—Harry Truman and civil rights. 

I. Truman’s Civil Rights Record

How and why the civil rights movement was successful in changing America between the 1940s and the 1960s sheds important historical light on the power and limitations of presidential action in fostering positive change. In looking back over the past 60 years, certain events stand out in the fight for civil rights. These include the Birmingham bus boycott, the lunch counter sit-ins in the South, President Kennedy’s TV address supporting James Meredith’s entrance to the University of Mississippi, and the 1963 March on Washington with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s powerful “I have a dream” speech—none of which occurred on Truman’s watch. 

Few Americans today would be able to recall all that transpired during Harry Truman’s seven years in office. Still fewer would attribute any of the success of the civil rights movement to him. Yet, Truman had a profound impact. And it was one he made by acting on his own, without the support of Congress. Throughout his presidency, Truman used executive orders, presidential appointments, and speeches to effect civil rights reform. What he accomplished in seven years provides a useful yardstick for measuring George W. Bush’s action on human life issues in his first term.

Harry Truman was an accidental president, thrust into office at the death of Franklin Roosevelt on April 12, 1945; he had been vice-president for just 82 days. Few Americans knew anything about him, and many of those who did felt that he wasn’t up to the job. He inherited the huge domestic and international problems that FDR had faced—especially the need to defeat Japan and the decision to use the atomic bomb—and daunting challenges that were on the horizon—the reconstruction of Europe and the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine and the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, the Cold War, the issue of Palestine, and, in his last two years, the Korean war.

Another hurdle for the new president, on the issue of civil rights in particular, was the Congress. He was almost immediately stymied by Southern Democrats who “effectively used the filibuster to control the domestic legislative agenda of the House and Senate during the 1940s.”² Despite these obstacles, Truman made civil rights a top priority of his administration.³

In December, 1946, Truman issued Executive Order 9808, creating the first President’s Committee on Civil Rights. He was moved to take this step by a series of shocking assaults on returning black war veterans. Ten months later, the president publicly welcomed the Committee’s 178-page report, titled “To Secure These Rights,” as “a declaration of our renewed faith in the American goal—the integrity of the individual human being, sustained by the moral consensus of the whole Nation, protected by a government based on equal freedom under just laws.”⁴

Truman issued a series of forceful statements in support of civil rights, beginning on June 29, 1947 when he became the first president to address the NAACP. In his speech, Truman declared: “We cannot await the growth of a will to action [on civil rights] in the slowest state or the most backward community. Our national government must show the way.”⁵ With that speech, Truman became the first president to “unequivocally . . . commit himself and the federal government to ‘civil rights and human freedom of black Americans.”⁶

 In January, 1948, in his third State of the Union Address, Truman promoted a ten-point civil rights program. “The basic source of our strength is spiritual,” he reminded Americans, “for we are a people with a faith. We believe in the dignity of man. We believe that he was created in the image of the Father of us all.” A month later, on February 2, he delivered a Special Message to Congress on Civil Rights, based on the Committee’s report. In it, he reiterated his 10-point program, which included anti-lynching laws, the abolition of the poll tax, the establishment of a Commission on Civil Rights, and the desegregation of the armed forces.

A Gallup Poll taken a few weeks after Truman’s message to Congress showed that 82% of the public opposed his civil rights program.⁷ But the president persevered. Two of the most significant acts by Truman concerning civil rights occurred in July, 1948, when he issued Executive Orders calling for the integration of the federal civil service (#9980) and the United States armed forces (#9981). The first of these overturned segregationist policies instituted by another Democratic president, Woodrow Wilson. It was the president’s steady commitment to civil rights that provoked the “Dixiecrat” revolt in the Democratic Party, resulting in South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond’s candidacy for President in 1948, and seriously threatening Truman’s re-election.

Truman supported a strong civil rights plank in the 1948 Democratic Party platform and delivered an important civil rights address before 65,000 African-Americans in Harlem on October 29, 1948—a year to the day after the Civil Rights Committee’s report and just four days before the 1948 presidential election. “Our determination to attain the goal of equal rights and equal opportunity must be resolute and unwavering,” he insisted. “For my part, I intend to keep moving toward this goal with every ounce of strength and determination that I have.”⁸ Historian Michael Gardner described Truman’s Harlem speech as “profoundly spiritual.”⁹ The Chicago Sun-Times called it a “prayerful campaign event.”

In June, 1952, Truman became the first president to give a commencement address at Howard University, the country’s preeminent black institution of higher learning. “Our country was founded on the proposition that all men are created equal,” he told graduates. “This means that they should be equal before the law. They should enjoy equal political rights. And they should have equal opportunities for education, employment and decent living conditions. This is our belief and we know it is right. We know it is morally right.”

Truman delivered a second civil rights address in Harlem in October, 1952, in which he gave a wide-ranging review of his Administration’s record on civil rights. In his eighth and final State of the Union Address on January 7, 1953, Truman again reviewed the progress that had been made during his presidency, concluding that “there has been a great awakening of the American conscience on the issues of civil rights.”

Perhaps the most far-reaching action by Truman concerning civil rights reform was directing his Justice Department to support a series of important cases before the Supreme Court. These culminated in the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954, which overturned the half-century old “separate-but-equal” doctrine. 

Historian Michael Gardner summarized Truman’s impact: “After repeatedly trying throughout most of his seven-year presidency to have his civil rights proposals enacted by the Congress, President Harry Truman resigned himself in 1952 to the reality that his only legacy in the civil rights area would be those actions that required no congressional concurrence.”¹⁰ 

Truman’s civil rights initiatives—executive orders, regulations, appointments and speeches—eliminating racist policies and instigating significant changes, laid a foundation for future advances. It is hard to see personal political advantage as a motive for his commitment; indeed, political disadvantage was clearly the result. But civil rights leaders came to regard Harry Truman as the first president since Abraham Lincoln to make important strides in the ongoing march for reform.

II. George Bush’s Record

Just as Truman became president in a political, social and legal context that shaped and limited what he could accomplish on black civil rights, George W. Bush took office in a context which limits what he can achieve in the struggle to establish the civil rights of the unborn. He became president under the cloud of the 2000 election recount and the Supreme Court’s resolution in Bush v. Gore. (Sidewalks in Chicago still have black stamps proclaiming “Hail to the Thief.”) Only with his decisive action in response to the attacks of September 11th, and the subsequent success of the 2002 midterm elections, did Bush cease being an “accidental president” in the minds of many Americans. As Al Gore’s campaign chairman Tony Coelho acknowledged after the November, 2002 elections, “They [Bush and Rove] rolled the dice, they won, and now Bush has a huge mandate. It’s not about 9/11 anymore. He is the legitimate President.”¹¹

Bush also inherited a closely divided Congress. Four months into his first year push on domestic issues, Vermont Senator Jim Jeffords dropped his Republican affiliation and became an “Independent,” giving the Senate and its committee chairmanships to pro-abortion Democrats. (The June 4, 2001 Newsweek ran a flattering article titled, “Mr. Jeffords Blows Up Washington.”) Bush did more than most previous presidents had done to try to change the composition of the Senate at mid-term. The president’s party typically loses seats in these elections. But Bush committed considerable time and resources to Republican Senate candidates running in close states. It was a risky strategy, but it paid off big. The November, 2002 election was the first one since 1934 (FDR’s first term) in which a president picked up seats in both the House and Senate (two seats in the Senate, five in the House). Historic though they may have been, the gains weren’t enough to end the Senate battles over Bush’s more conservative judicial nominations.

In George Bush’s three years and a half years as President, sixteen pro-life actions and policy positions stand out, only three of which he accomplished through Congress. These were the Born Alive Infants Protection Act in August, 2002, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act in November, 2003, and the Unborn Victims of Violence Act in April, 2004. (A number of other important federal bills remain stalled in Congress. The Abortion Non-Discrimination Act (ANDA), for example, passed the House 229-189 on September 25, 2002 but remains tied up in the Senate.)

On assuming office, Bush reinstated the Mexico City Policy prohibiting the use of U.S. tax dollars by foreign non-governmental organizations that promote abortion. Other initiatives include resuming the practice of certifying that the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) supports a coercive abortion program in China, making UNFPA ineligible for U.S. foreign aid funds. His administration also made unborn children eligible for the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (S-CHIP).¹² This allows states to treat the unborn child as an independent individual eligible for federally funded prenatal care.

President Bush’s first significant public action on a life issue came in a nationwide speech on August 9, 2001, when he declared that he would not permit federal funding for embryonic stem-cell research that relies on future destruction of human embryos. At the same time, Bush announced that he was creating the President’s Council on Bioethics, to be chaired by Dr. Leon Kass. (One forgets that right up until September 10, 2001, the New York Times and other papers were regularly running front-page stories on the embryonic stem-cell debate.)

The president also endorsed a federal ban on all human cloning, declaring it to be one of his two pro-life goals (along with getting the Partial Birth Abortion Ban bill passed) in his State of the Union address in January, 2003. Bush directed the U.S. delegation at the United Nations to take a strong stand in support of an international ban that would cover so called therapeutic, or research cloning, as well as reproductive cloning. On December 9, 2003, the U.N. postponed the decision for a year. As reported in the New York Times, Richard Grenell, the spokesman for the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., said the United States “was happy to go along with the one-year consensus but would not alter its stance, ‘We will continue to work for a total ban.’” This is the way the British Ambassador to the U.N.—a supporter of cloning for experimental purposes—framed the U.S. position: “It is clear there is no consensus in respect to therapeutic cloning research, but by ignoring this fact and pressing for action to ban all cloning, supporters of the Costa Rican resolution [i.e., the U.S.] have effectively destroyed the possibility of action on the important area on which we are all agreed—a ban on reproductive cloning.” To accept the British position supporting “therapeutic cloning” however, would mean not only permitting human embryos to be created simply for the purpose of experimentation, but mandating their destruction as well.

In a related action spurred by the widening stem-cell debate, a presidential advisory committee adopted the policy that human beings at the embryonic stage will be considered as “Human Subjects” for purposes of applying rules regulating human experimentation.¹³

Regarding another life and death matter, in 2001 Attorney General John Ashcroft interpreted the Controlled Substances Act as forbidding the use of federally controlled drugs for assisted suicides. His directive was promptly challenged by the Governor of Oregon, the only state where assisted suicide is legal. The case, Oregon v. Ashcroft, was recently decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which, in a 2-1 ruling, concluded that Ashcroft had exceeded his legal authority.

Finally, in October, 2003, Bush publicly supported his brother Jeb when the Florida governor ordered that Terry Schiavo’s feeding tube be reinserted. That decade-old case remains in litigation, as Ms. Schiavo’s parents and siblings continue to fight her husband’s attempt to end her life.

President Bush has also taken action on several broader social policies that might not be considered sanctity of life issues, traditionally speaking, but should be seen as helping to build a culture of life. These include an increase in the child-tax credit from $500 to $1000, a reduction in the “marriage penalty,” faith-based initiatives created by executive order (when Congress would not pass his entire bill), the new marriage assistance program in the Department of Health & Human Services, and Bush’s declared goal in his 2004 State of the Union address to double federal funding for abstinence programs.

III.  Judging Presidents

It is impossible at this time—three and a half years into his first term and the future uncertain—to assess George W. Bush’s advancement of the sanctity of life cause. But it is critical to emphasize that no judgment of Bush on pro-life matters can be adequate without also judging him on his broader effectiveness as President. Judging him solely on “pro-life” matters measures his good intentions, but this is not enough, because politics is a matter of action requiring practical judgment. Political leaders in a fallen world are not prophets. Nor can they just stand “athwart history and yell, ‘Stop!’” As Aristotle emphasized, the end of politics is “not knowing but doing.”

The second reason that broader effectiveness is essential to any judgment on pro-life matters is this: No pro-life presidential candidate can make a difference without being elected and no pro-life president can make as much of a difference in four years as he can in eight. Indeed, no pro-life candidate can be elected in the first place—or reelected—without the judgment by the public that he has a broader agenda and will be effective in accomplishing other things. A president with a “pro-life” reputation needs to succeed in other areas for the success of his pro-life agenda.

Four years may seem like a long time to most people. Presidents sense that time is fleeting; this is especially so for Bush. As the historian Richard Brookhiser put it, “The best a President can hope to do is identify a handful of problems and, by bearing down on them, accomplish a handful of things.”¹⁴  Presidents are judged by the goals they set and how they achieve them in four years, and many have noted that Bush’s goals were transformed by the events of September 11. Since then, his principal mission has been the security of the American people. As that day reminds us, presidents do not control their own agenda. Bioethics Council chairman Leon Kass has noted that “2001 was . . . the year in which our world was drastically changed, and with it our nation’s mood and attention.”¹⁵

As we have already observed, the achievements of even the most influential Presidents are inevitably shaped by the cultural and political context in which they are inaugurated.  In the hindsight of more than 60 years, the threat from Hitler in the 1930s seems clear, but FDR swam against a very strong current in giving help to Great Britain through “Lend-Lease” in 1940-1941. This was reflected in FDR’s poignant remark, “It’s a terrible thing to look over your shoulder when you’re trying to lead and to find no one there.”

The two areas in which pro-life Americans may be most critical of Bush’s efforts are his support for federally funded research on existing stem-cell lines and his lack of progress in getting his judicial nominees confirmed.

Bush’s most important speech on the life issues to date was his August, 2001 address to the nation on stem-cell research. It was significant in its extensive review of the scientific and ethical issues involved, and because it centered on developing human lives at the embryonic stage—the basic issue in in vitro fertilization (IVF) which is the gateway to cloning and genetic manipulation. Pro-lifers were not united in their reaction to the decision Bush had made to allow partial funding for embryonic stem-cell research. Some, like the Catholic theologian and commentator Michael Novak, were critical; others applauded it as a “principled compromise.” Novak’s analysis at the time was correct: The benefit that might be derived from embryonic research does not justify using human beings as a means to that end.

In retrospect, however, the narrow line Bush drew appears to have inhibited the growth of embryonic stem-cell research. A Senate hearing in September, 2002 featured scientists who complained that embryonic research in the United States was “moving exceedingly slowly” due to President Bush’s restrictions on federal funding.¹⁶ And on November 10, 2003, an ethics committee sponsored by Johns Hopkins University concluded that it would be unethical and risky to treat people with embryonic stem cells allowed by Bush’s policy because they were initially grown on mouse cells which could expose humans to an animal virus.¹⁷ These complaints are obviously self-serving and designed to drum up opposition to the President’s policy, but, as evidence of the inhibiting effect of the President’s policy, they are significant.

Future technologies that could be used to re-engineer human beings may  impact the future of the human race more widely and permanently than legalized abortion has. This is why the most important action by Bush in his first term may have been the creation of the President’s Council on Bioethics. Under the inspired direction of Leon Kass, the 18-member Council has issued a number of important reports that have the potential for shaping public debate and federal and state policy for years to come. In July, 2002, the Council released “Human Cloning and Human Dignity.” A second report, “Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness,” was published in October, 2003. “Reproduction and Responsibility: The Regulation of the New Biotechnologies,” which appeared in April, 2004, is a revision of a June 2003 Discussion Document on how biotechnologies are affecting the beginning stages of human life. It observes that, compared with other countries, reproductive technology in the United States is “relatively unmonitored and unregulated”—data collection on the health of in vitro children and their mothers, for example, is not required. A fourth document, titled Being Human, is a marvelous collection of readings and a valuable teaching aide.

Like Truman’s Civil Rights Committee, the Council’s actions and proposals may be ignored by Congress now, but they remind the nation of moral truths about human beings and human nature that may move future generations to action. President Bush should not consign the wisdom of the Council’s members to its internal deliberations. Instead, he should rely on that wisdom to publicly inform Americans about the radically different choices they have before them and the directions in which those choices will lead the nation.

Thirty-one years after Roe v. Wade, the use of judicial nominations to change the ideological makeup of federal courts is still front and center in national politics and elections. Senate Democrats have blocked at least six Bush judicial nominees to the federal appeals courts: Miguel Estrada, Janice Rogers Brown, Charles Pickering, William Pryor, Priscilla Owens, and Carolyn Kuhl. Some pro-lifers think the president’s power to make recess appointments of federal judges is a silver bullet that Bush has failed to take advantage of. This reflects a misunderstanding about the clear limitations on recess appointments. Article II, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution reads: “The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.” Significant cases on social issues are only occasionally presented to federal judges. The likelihood that a recess nominee will be assigned to and rule on a “pro-life” case by the time his or her commission expires is slim. The nominee also has to want the temporary appointment and must give up any office or job he or she currently holds. It is likely that the most qualified nominees are not willing to put up with the hassle, or give up their current livelihood, for a temporary seat. 

These limitations are demonstrated in the two recess appointments Bush has made: federal district judge Charles Pickering to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on January 16, 2004, and Alabama Attorney General William Pryor to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit. Judge Pickering, who had to give up his life-time appointment to the federal district court, will end up sitting on the Fifth Circuit for only 12 months. Pryor may be able to serve until late in 2005.

Many pro-lifers also wish the Bush Administration would do more to end Democratic filibusters of judicial nominees. But the filibuster is a Senate rule, not a federal law—only senators, by changing their own rules, can end or limit the filibuster. And because ending the filibuster on judicial nominees might compromise or even end the filibuster entirely, it is unlikely Senate Republicans will do this.

By the end of March, 2004, the nominations process had been further politicized. Despite the fact that the Constitution grants the president virtually unrestricted recess appointment power, and Bush had used it only twice, Senate Democrats threatened to obstruct all judicial nominees until the President agreed not to make any further recess appointments. The significant limitations on alternative means of appointing judges serve to clarify the importance of the 2004 presidential and Senate elections as the “main event.” The only solution to this problem is political—at the ballot box, in the election of senators who will back Bush’s nominees. 

Clearly, Bush could do more. He never mentioned the culture of life in his January, 2004 State of the Union address, much less sanctity of life issues specifically, and that address sends a strong message about his vision and priorities for a second term. He has not highlighted or reinforced the proposals of his Council on Bioethics. He has not exerted pressure for a federal cloning ban or for the Abortion Non-Discrimination Act. He has done nothing yet—at least publicly—to reexamine the FDA’s reckless approval of RU-486, despite some deaths, including that of Holly Patterson in the San Francisco Bay area in 2003. We must remember, however, that judging what is possible and choosing effective means requires a complex, internal analysis that is rarely available to the public.

As the 2004 campaign heats up, the President eventually will have to address the abortion issue. Can he effectively navigate the abortion divide and speak persuasively to Middle America? Bush’s advisors would probably prefer that he say as little as possible on the issue, and they may calculate that—having taken a “moderate” position on abortion in his first term and for other reasons—abortion will be a non-issue in the re-election campaign. And if they are worried by the President’s “numbers” with women voters, they may also presume that the less he says on abortion the better. The Democratic nominee will undoubtedly make abortion as much of an issue as possible, especially highlighting the prospect of Supreme Court vacancies to fill on the next president’s watch.

Bush has demonstrated in his first term, however, that he is willing to take risks in the short term for greater goals over the long term. There are two sides of the coin in the abortion debate: the impact of abortion on the child and its impact on women. By recognizing abortion’s negative impact on women, Bush can join a debate that is necessary to move public attitudes toward a culture of life over the longer term and address abortion in a compassionate and realistic manner that engages the public.

That many Americans see abortion as a “necessary evil” is clear. For the past 30 years, the polling data consistently shows that beneath the superficial labels of “pro-life” and “pro-choice,” “[t]he majority of Americans morally disapprove of the majority of abortions currently performed,” as University of Virginia sociologist James Hunter, put it in his landmark book.¹⁸ The Chicago Tribune aptly summarized the situation in a September 1996 editorial: “Most Americans are uncomfortable with all-or-nothing policies on abortion. They generally shy away from proposals to ban it in virtually all circumstances, but neither are they inclined to make it available on demand no matter what the circumstances. They regard it, at best, as a necessary evil.”

If Middle America—as James Hunter calls the 60% in the middle—sees abortion as an evil, why is it thought to be “necessary”? Although the 1991 Gallup Poll did not probe this question specifically, the data make clear that it is not because Middle America sees abortion as “necessary” to secure “equal opportunities for women.” Instead, many Americans may see abortion as “necessary” in certain narrow circumstances to avert “the back alley” or to secure “women’s health.”

The Achilles heel of John Kerry’s position—or that of any of the Democratic candidates—on abortion is that it blindly protects philandering men who put women in the precarious position of an unwanted pregnancy and an uncommitted relationship, conveniently ignoring the negative impact, physical or psychological, that most women experience, while offering them the carrot of “choice.”

The most significant thing that Bush can do is to address the other side of the coin: the negative impact of abortion on women. Although the impact on the child has to be reinforced in the public mind, it speaks mainly to the pro-life choir. In the back of Middle America’s mind, when it comes to abortion restrictions, there’s always the question: “What about the impact on women?” And the public generally believes that legalized abortion has been—on balance—good for women.  

Middle America’s sense that abortion is a “necessary evil” can best be addressed by speaking to the negative impact on women. Helping the public understand the real damage abortion does to women, and highlighting the alternatives available, may contribute to a renewal of public dialogue that we so sorely need on this issue. The physical and psychological burden that women experience is a compelling reason to give women full information, encourage alternatives, and prevent hasty, pressured decisions to opt for abortion.  A modest step could highlight the significant risks from abortion that medical science has identified and the need for improved public health data collection and dissemination for further research.

Ironically, a pro-abortion president can do more damage, on balance, than a pro-life president can promote positive change, due to the pivotal role of the Supreme Court in the abortion issue. The clearest example is still Supreme Court nominations. The president elected in November, 2004 will likely have the opportunity to name successors for at least two justices—Chief Justice William Rehnquist (he will turn 80 in October, 2004) and Justice John Paul Stevens (84 in April, 2004). The two justices nominated by Bill Clinton—Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer—were the deciding votes in the Court’s 5-4 decision in Stenberg v. Carhart (2000) that struck down laws against partial-birth abortion in 30 states. 

The unique power to make Supreme Court appointments notwithstanding, presidents are limited in their capacity to create a culture of life—limited by the Constitution (with its federal system and separation of powers), limited by time, limited by resources. The same diffusion of power in a representative democracy that is necessary for liberty limits a president’s assertion of power, for good or evil. And that’s how it should be in a government under law. That understanding of presidential limits should remind Americans working for a culture of life that they must rely on themselves more than political leaders to create a culture of life and to build the vital centers of cultural influence on which political leaders necessarily depend. 

 

NOTES

1.   Harry Jaffa, Crisis of the House Divided: An Interpretation of the Issues in the Lincoln-Douglas Debates 370 (1959).

2.   Michael R. Gardner, Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage and Political Risks 20 (Southern Illinois University Press 2002).

3.   Gardner 71-72.

4.   Gardner 43.

5.   Gardner at x.

6.   Gardner 28

7.   Gardner 83.

8.   Gardner 122.

9.   Gardner 142.

10.  Gardner at 198.

11.  James Carney & John Dickerson, “W. and the ‘Boy Genius,’” Time, November 18, 2002,  p. 42.

12.  A proposed rule was published at 67 Fed. Reg. 9936 (March 5, 2002). 

13.  A proposed rule was published at 66 Fed. Reg. 35576 (July 6, 2001).

14.  Richard Brookhiser, The Mind of George W. Bush, The Atlantic, April, 2003, p. 65.

15.  Leon R. Kass, Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics 2 (2002).

16.  Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Stem cell research is slowed by restrictions, Scientists Say,” New York Times, September 26, 2002, at A23.

17.  L.A. Daily News, Tuesday, November 11, 2003, p. 7.

18. James Davison Hunter, Before the Shooting Begins: Searching for Democracy in America’s Culture Wars (1994).